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

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⑥ Lessons Learned, Headquarters,

# II FIELD FORCE VIETNAM

⑨ OPERATIONAL REPORT ON  
for quarterly period ending 31 Jul 66.


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## LESSON LEARNED

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OPERATIONAL REPORT FOR PERIOD ENDING 31 JULY 1966

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01 OCT 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending  
31 July 1966 (RCS CSFOR-65)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY, VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96307

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of  
the Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

1. (U) The Operational Report-Lessons Learned submitted by II  
Field Force Vietnam for the reporting period ending 31 July 1966 is for-  
warded herewith.

2. (U) This headquarters concurs with the basic report as modi-  
fied by the comment in Paragraph 3 below.

3. (C) Reference Paragraph 5e(5), Section I: 18th Engineer Bri-  
gade reconnaissance reports classify that portion of National Highway 15  
from Phuoc Li to Vung Tau as class 12, not 20 as reported. This infor-  
mation has been forwarded to II Field Force Vietnam

FOR THE COMMANDER



R. J. THORNTON  
1st Lt, AGC  
Asst Adjutant General

2 Incl  
as

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS II FIELD FORCE VIETNAM  
APO San Francisco 96266

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15 August 1966

SUBJECT: Operational Report for quarterly period ending 31 July 1966  
(RCS CSFOR-65)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

## SECTION I

### SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITIES

#### 1. (C) COMMAND:

a. Since the last reporting period, the assigned and attached strengths of II Field Force Vietnam have steadily increased. On 20 May 1966, the 219th Military Intelligence Detachment was attached by General Order number 56, Headquarters, United States Army Vietnam, dated 20 May 1966 with an effective date of 10 May 1966. This was followed by the 7th Military History Detachment, attached by USARV GO 3291, effective 1 June 1966. Early in June the 53d Signal Battalion (Corps), plus the 16th Public Information Detachment (Field Service) and the 16th Signal Detachment (Photographic Assignment) arrived in-country and were attached per USARV GO 3536 effective 4 June 1966. The 517th Engineer Detachment (Terrain) was also attached effective 4 June 1966 on the same General Order. A comparison of the assigned/attached strength for Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam at the end of the last two reporting periods is as follows:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>OFFICER</u>	<u>WARRANT OFFICER</u>	<u>ENLISTED MEN</u>
30 Apr 66	111	10	201
31 Jul 66	164	23	1024

b. Major subordinate units are shown at inclosure 1. Locations are shown at inclosure 2.

c. Distinguished visitors received by this headquarters for the months of May, June, and July are shown at inclosures 3, 4, and 5.

#### 2. (C) PERSONNEL, MORALE AND DISCIPLINE:

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a. The health of the command remains excellent. No unusual diseases or significant outbreaks of disease have been noted. The general sanitation of area is constantly improving. The improvement is a reflection of duration of time in-country allowing for increased effort on sanitation. There were seventy-six (76) cases of malaria diagnosed in units under operational control of II Field Force Vietnam during the quarter. The late onset of the monsoon season appears to have delayed the expected increase in malaria cases, July being the only month that reflected a significant increase.

b. To increase the proficiency of administrative personnel assigned to the headquarters, the Adjutant General organized and conducted a clerical school.

c. In the area of Civilian Personnel, a requirement for a Labor Officer developed due to the large number of local nationals employed by this headquarters and attached units. This function is being performed jointly by the ACOs, G1 and the Headquarters Commandant. A recommendation was made to add a labor section to the Headquarters Commandant Section by augmentation in order to centralize control in this area.

d. The deletion of the Provost Marshal from the G1 section and the addition of a Provost Marshal section to function in the areas of installation security, control of local nationals, prisoner control, plus law enforcement and discipline is felt to be justified.

e. Maintenance of discipline, law and order has been excellent during the reporting period. There were no serious incidents or accidents reported through 31 July 1966.

f. The 17th Radio Research Unit was attached to Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam for Military Justice effective 8 June 1966, per GO 10, Headquarters, 509th Radio Relay Group, dated 8 June 1966.

g. Plans were initiated to begin Annual General Inspections of assigned and attached units beginning in October 1966. Preliminary inspections will begin in September to assist units under Operational Control of this headquarters to prepare for Annual General Inspections by the USARV Inspector General. As pertains to morale and discipline, no problems were encountered in this area during the reporting period.

## 3. (C) INTELLIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE:

a. The G2 Section expanded its operations due to the arrival

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of the 219th Military Intelligence Detachment. The 219th MI Det (Corps) arrived in-country on 9 May 1966 and became operational on 9 June 1966. Selected personnel from the detachment were integrated into the G2 Operations and G2 Air Divisions, and the remainder of the unit established the II FFORCEV Intelligence Center. The nucleus of the center, the Order of Battle Section, works in close coordination with the Imagery Interpretation, Interrogation, Counterintelligence and Document and Material Exploitation Sections. The activities of the center have greatly assisted the G2 Section in the production, evaluation and dissemination of intelligence information.

b. Presently the Interrogation Teams from the 219th MI Det are being used to supplement teams of the units under operational control of Headquarters, II FFORCEV. Arrangements have been made to attach ARVN interrogators to the Interrogation Teams of the 219th MI Det to provide a capability for interrogation of prisoners at Hq II FFORCEV.

c. For a description and recapitulation of Enemy Order of Battle see inclosure 6.

## 4. (C) OPERATIONS, PLANS AND TRAINING:

a. Since the southwest monsoon season begins in May, a campaign plan was developed by COMUSMACV defining the strategy to be used in combating the VC/NVA forces during this period. In order to aid II FFORCE's development of a plan of action based upon the MACV plan, a study group was formed in late April 1966 to war game likely VC courses of action. A plan was developed that envisioned employment of forces to hold the national priority areas; to clear those areas of local VC; and to protect the rice harvest. In addition, a plan providing for the defense and security of the LONG BINH sub area was formulated during this period.

b. Other major operations initiated by direction of this headquarters were:

<u>Operation</u>	<u>Unit</u>	<u>Dates</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Type</u>
Birmingham I & II	1st Inf Div	24 Apr-16 May	Tay Ninh & Binh Duong	S&D
Hardihood	173d Abn Bde	16 May- 8 Jun	Phuoc Tuy Province	S&D, clearing
Hollandia	173d Abn Bde	8 Jun-18 Jun	Phuoc Tuy Province	S&D, clearing
Yorktown	173d Abn Bde	23 Jun- 8 Jul	Long Khan Province	S&D, clearing
Aurora I & II	173d Abn Bde	9 Jul-31 Jul	Long Khan Province	Spoiling attacks
Kahana I & II	25th Inf Div	6 Jul-31 Jul	Long Khan Bien Tuy	Spoiling attacks

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c. Plans were made for the reception, staging and movement to base areas for the following units scheduled to arrive during the period August - November 1966.

11th Armored Cavalry Regiment

196th Infantry Brigade (Sep)

Philippine Civil Action Group, Vietnam

2d Battalion, 34th Armor

2d Battalion, 11th Artillery (155mm towed)

d. The 1st Australian Task Force arrived in-country and moved into an area via Ba Ria (YS 4637) during the period 20 April - 12 June 66. In the same period the 1st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment ceased to be under OPCON of the 173d Airborne Brigade (Sep) and returned to Australia. The 4th Battalion, 503d Infantry arrived in RVN and was assigned to the 173d Airborne Brigade (Sep) in July 1966. The 2d Battalion, 35th Artillery (155mm SP) also arrived and joined II FFORCEV Artillery.

e. As part of a continuing program to counter VC tax collection activities and to further road security within III CTZ, II FFORCEV developed plans requiring subordinate units to conduct ground and airmobile operations in assigned areas to destroy VC engaged in tax collection and traffic disruption activities.

f. Profiting from experience gained by in-country operations, a draft MTOE for Headquarters, II FFORCEV (TOE 52-1T) was prepared. The draft MTOE is presently being staffed within the headquarters.

g. During the past quarter, staff studies were completed on the following subjects:

(1) Requirement for Armored Personnel Carriers for Infantry Divisions.

(2) Requirement for M548 Cargo Carrier.

(3) Requirement for XM551.

(4) Requirement for 4th Infantry Rifle Company for Infantry Battalions.

(5) Requirement for Aviation Support for Combat Support and Combat Service Support units.

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
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- (6) Requirement for Night Observation Binoculars.
- (7) Requirement for Xenon Searchlight.
- (8) Requirement for Kit, Armor Plate.
- (9) Requirement for Long Range Patrols.
- (10) Augmentation of Infantry Division Air Cavalry.
- (11) Requirement for Tactical Carrier Companies for II FFORCEV.
- (12) Requirement for Weapon Mix and Sniper Scopes.
- (13) Requirement for Armor Piercing Ammunition in Vietnam.
- (14) Determine Ammunition Requirement for II FFORCEV.
- (15) Operations in the Mekong Delta.
- (16) Plan for Up-grading of Air Fields in III CTZ through FY 67.
- (17) RVNAF Manpower and Force Structure.

h. Experience indicated that the coordination for allocation of air resources was not sufficiently refined nor responsive to meet and satisfy the immediate requirements for airlift support. As a result, all air activity was grouped under the G3 Air Branch. This expanded the scope of responsibility normally associated with the G3 Air, but it allowed these activities to be consolidated under one head. An organizational sketch of this regroupment is shown below:



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This concept has been in effect for only a short time but the advantages accrued are already manifest. The intra-office coordination between Army Aviation and Air Force airlift has materially reduced the requirement to implement emergency procedures to satisfy immediate requirements for airlift support. For statistics on tactical air sorties and Arc Light missions see inclosure 20.

## 5. (C) Logistics

### a. Operations

(1) The organization of the G4 section underwent one major change followed by one minor change. The final organization (incl 18) resulted in the following functional organization: the ACoS, G4 (and Deputy); an Administrative Branch; a Plans and Operations Division (to include transportation); and a Supply and Service Division. Based upon experience gained from the critical months of operation in this environment, it is believed that this organization will better facilitate the accomplishment of the logistics mission in the present tactical posture.

(2) Logistical support was focused on the following major tactical operations.

(a) Operation DENVER (10-25 May). This operation was supported principally by airlift into the SONG BE airstrip out of Bien Hoa and Tan Son Nhut. The 1st Logistical Command assisted in the operation by moving Class V by truck from the Long Binh ASP to the 173d Airborne Brigade Support Battalion area at Bien Hoa, where trained personnel of the Brigade palletized the supplies for air delivery.

(b) Operation BIRMINGHAM (24 April-17 May). This operation was supported from Tay Ninh III airstrip by elements of the 1st Logistical Command, and marked the first instance in the III CTZ in which the Logistical Command supported an operation by means of a forward support area. Resupply was accomplished by both land and air lines of communication (LOC). The land LOC utilized both Routes 1 & 22 and By-Pass 19. Initially the roads would accommodate only 2½ ton trucks; however, by 5 May the roads had been improved to a class 60 route. At the conclusion of the operation, approximately 250 tons of Class V were turned over to the 25th Infantry Division and 88 tons of JP-4 fuel had been transferred to Tay Ninh I for "Skybolt" stocks. The 1st Logistical Command back-hauled approximately 80 tons of miscellaneous Class V supplies.

(c) Operations EL PASO I, II, & III (2 June-Present). This series of operations was supplied principally by air LOC out of

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Bien Hoa and Tan Son Nhut; troop and equipment moves were supported from Phuoc Vinh, Lai Khe, Long Thanh North ("Bear Cat") into the areas of Song Be, Loc Ninh, Minh Thanh, Quan Loi and Hon Quan.

(d) Operations AURORA I and II (15 July - 1 August). This series of operations, conducted by the 173d Airborne Brigade, was supported by both land and air LOC. The air LOC operated mainly out of Bien Hoa and Tan Son Nhut with 1st Logistical Command coordinating the detailed "marrying-up" of supply and airlift. Coordination by this headquarters consisted of processing airlift request for initial tactical deployment and extraction scheduled for July and processing requests for emergency resupply.

Land LOC support was continuous during the operation, both with regard to movement of supplies and tactical troop movements. The 1st Logistical Command furnished a peak input of 50 trucks during extraction from the operation in addition to providing 18 trucks throughout the operation.

(e) Operation KAHANA (15 July - 1 August). This operation, originally planned as a two battalion operation by the 25th Infantry Division but later reduced to a battalion force, was supported with airlift for the initial tactical deployment and for the extraction phase. Only minimum resupply was programmed and required.

One significant facet of this operation was that both the 173d Airborne Brigade and the 25th Infantry Division elements operated from the same airstrip at Vo Dat.

## b. Transportation.

(1) Experience gained over the reporting period indicates that transportation functions of this office will fall into the following categories of activities:

(a) Coordination with the 4th Transportation Command for notification of incoming vessels carrying troops and equipment of units assigned to, or under operational control of, this headquarters.

(b) Processing requests from units for additional vehicles to move troops and supplies.

(c) Processing requests for highway clearance through Saigon.

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(d) In coordination with the II FFORCEV Engineer, maintaining data on MSR's and route classification.

(2) Major transportation moves coordinated by this office are outlined below:

(a) Movement of 1/69th Armor. Coordination was made with Transportation Movement Agency (TMA) and the 25th Infantry Division to effect movement of the 1/69th Armor from Cu Chi to Pleiku. Movement was by road convoy from Cu Chi to Saigon Port on 14, 15, and 16 May. Personnel and equipment were loaded on each of four LST's on 15, 16, 17, and 18 May. Debarkation was made at Qui Nhon with subsequent road convoy move to Pleiku.

(b) Movement of the 53d Signal Battalion. Coordination was made with 1st Logistical Command and the 53d Signal Battalion to move the battalion, arriving on the USS Gordon, from Vung Tau to Bien Hoa on 4 June by air. Cargo and equipment arrived by ocean transport on the USS Ocean Tide, USS Bernie Victory and USS Evergreen State on 11 and 13 June.

(c) Coordination was effected between the 23d Artillery Group, 1st Logistical Command and Hq II FFORCEV Artillery for the movement of the 2d Battalion (155mm SP), 35th Artillery, arriving on the USS Walker, from Vung Tau to Bien Hoa by air on 23 June.

(d) Coordination was effected between the 1st Logistical Command and the 173d Airborne Brigade for movement of the 4th Battalion (Airborne), 503d Infantry, arriving on the USS Pope 25 June, from Vung Tau to Bien Hoa by air on 26 June.

(3) For a discussion of AIRLIFT see para 5a(1) and Incl 19.

## c. Maintenance.

(1) As a step towards insuring a high state of vehicle maintenance, a letter prescribing maintenance policies for this headquarters was published on 25 April. The contents of this letter were further reinforced through means of command emphasis and twice-daily motor stables.

(2) As a result of initial in-country experience and review of reports from other units, this headquarters dispatched a letter on 3 May to units under its control outlining maintenance procedures for generators, proper positioning of equipment, the requirement for back-up generators, and policies pertaining to operator, organizational, and field maintenance.

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(3) Periodic maintenance assistance visits were made to the 1st and 25th Infantry Divisions, the 173d Airborne Brigade, and the 23d Artillery Group. As a result of these visits and subsequent coordinated actions, several items of equipment were removed from deadline status. Additionally, back-up support was discussed with representatives from the 1st Logistical Command. These discussions resulted in expediting the evacuation of unserviceable items and in establishing a collection and classification point in the Long Binh area.

(4) During the reporting period, Brigadier General W. D. Crittenberger, Commanding General II FFORCEV Artillery, and Hq II FFORCEV Material Readiness Officer, gave further emphasis to the material readiness program initiated during the previous reporting period. This program, in addition to the prescribed monthly material readiness council meetings at which trends, problems and solutions are discussed, now includes these measures: an inspection program designed to inspect 25 per cent of each unit's equipment on a quarterly cycle; solicited visits and advice from USARV material readiness assistance teams; and vigorous and continuous followup on problem areas by unit material readiness officers. It is anticipated that such a systematic program, given adequate impetus by command interest, will appreciably improve the material readiness posture of Hq II FFORCEV assigned and attached units.

(5) In order to apprise the Commanding General and the II FFORCEV Material Readiness Officer of the operational status of certain critical items of equipment (radios, vehicles, generators), a weekly summary, in the form of charted trends, has been utilized by the G4 Section during this period.

(6) Pending arrival of a transportation car company to support Headquarters, II FFORCEV and certain small headquarters-type units, vehicles have been drawn to support requirements. These small units have been satellited on Headquarters Company, II FFORCEV, necessitating an augmentation of mechanics. Overflow maintenance is accomplished by the supporting DS Maintenance Company.

## d. Supply.

(1) The rapid build-up in Vietnam has dictated a need for commanders to take a serious look at supply discipline and maintenance in their units in order to prevent an unnecessary strain on the supply system resulting from waste and neglect. To attain this overall objective, COMUSMACV's letter of November 1965 (incl 21) on this subject was

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redistributed to the command in May of this year. The Commanding General, II FFORCEV added command emphasis to this subject by publishing a supplemental command letter in June (incl 22) stressing the importance of conservation of supplies through sound maintenance practices, the establishment of uninflated demands and the exercise of sound command management practices.

(2) During the reporting period, this headquarters participated with 1st Logistical Command and major tactical units in the formation of a provisional air delivery company (organized under TOE 10-407E). The purpose of forming this provisional unit was to cover contingencies pending the arrival of the 109th QM Air Delivery Company in September or October. The capabilities of the provisional unit are:

- (a) An initial heavy drop of 250 S/T per day.
- (b) A sustained heavy drop of 250 S/T for 12 consecutive days.

e. Status of Primary Land LOC's as of 31 July 1966.

(1) National Highway 13, Gia Dinh to Ben Cat. This route, in its present condition, is trafficable in its entirety. The gaps of four demolished bridges filled with laterite makes wet season trafficability somewhat hazardous. Traffic is limited to class 30. From Ben Cat to Loo Ninh, the route requires the use of AVMB's to cross the gaps of destroyed bridges.

(2) Interprovincial Highway 16 from XT 005050 to intersection with interprovincial Highway 1A, and then north on Highway 1A to Phuoc Vinh. This route is trafficable to class 30 loads limited by the Song Be and Phuoc Vinh bridges which are wide. A triple single Bailey Bridge is being repaired to handle class 45 loads at XT 936144.

(3) Provincial Route 2A from XT 796199 to XT 831340. This serves as an alternate MSR from the Phu Cuong area to the Phuoc Vinh area. This route, due to the absence of culverts and bridges, is not susceptible to major interdiction by the VC. A one day clearing operation will open it to class 60 loads.

(4) Provincial Route 7B. When used in connection with Route 2A, this provides a route from Ben Cat to Phu Cuong or Phuoc Vinh. It has no culverts or bridges and a clearing operation will open it to class 60 loads.

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(5) National Highway 15 from Bien Hoa to Phuoc Le (Baria). Open to class 24 traffic. From Phuoc Le to Vung Tau it is a class 20 route. The Ministry of Public Works is involved in a construction program to upgrade the bridges to class 50. Work is progressing rapidly on the portion of the route between Bien Hoa and Phuoc Le.

(6) National Highway 1 and 22 from Saigon to Tay Ninh. This highway will accept class 60 traffic on Highway 1 from Saigon to Go Dau Ha and is limited to class 20 traffic from Go Dau Ha to Tay Ninh. Using AVLB's and a limited amount of upgrading on the longer bridges, this route can be made class 60 in its entirety.

(7) Interprovincial Highway 2 from Xuan Loc to Phuoc Le. Open during dry weather if by-passes around the collapsed bridges are used.

(8) National Highway 1 from Bien Hoa to Phan Thiet. Open to class 40 traffic from Bien Hoa to a point 2 kilometers south of Gia Ray. East of Gia Ray the VC have destroyed a number of bridges. Using by-passes, the route is open to the Ham Tan road junction. No definite information is known about the route from the Ham Tan junction to the II-III CTZ boundary.

(9) Construction underway.

(a) National Highway 15 is being repaired and improved.

(b) Interprovincial Highway 16 is being repaired and maintained by the US 1st Infantry Division. An upgrading program to class 50 is being effected.

(c) Road clearing operations are being run on National Highway 13.

(d) Tay Ninh by-pass road from Go Dau Ha (Routes 19 and 26) can be used after clearing operations and repair of 3 bridges.

6. (U) Information.

a. The 16th Public Information Detachment arrived in-country and was assigned to II Field Force Vietnam on 4 June 1966. Activated at Fort George G. Meade, Maryland, per General Order Number 4, Headquarters, Fort George G. Meade, Maryland, dated 14 January 1966, with an effective date of 24 January 1966, the detachment was organized under TOE 45-500E (2 Apr 63) as a field service forward area Public Information Team with the mission of providing information support for a corps or logistical area command.

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The detachment has an authorized strength of four (4) officers (1 Major, 3 Captains) and nine (9) enlisted men.

b. The detachment departed Fort Meade on 15 May 1966, by commercial air to Oakland Army Terminal, California, where it embarked on the troop ship, USNS General W. H. Gordon on 16 May 1966. Upon joining II FFORCEV, the detachment merged with the Information Office and became an integral part of its operation.

c. The following fact sheets were published by the Information Office during the reporting period to support the Command Information Program.

- (1) Fact Sheet #2 "South Vietnam" (15 May 66)
- (2) Fact Sheet #3 "Knowledge, Control, Cure" (disease and infection) (24 May 66)
- (3) Fact Sheet #4 "The Enemy in Your Hands" (How to treat POW's) (28 May 66)
- (4) Fact Sheet #5 "Inflation in Vietnam" (27 May 66)
- (5) Fact Sheet #6 "Your Special Services Program in Vietnam" (28 May 66)
- (6) Fact Sheet #7 "USMACV, History and Organization" (6 Jun 66)
- (7) Fact Sheet #8 "Excerpts from Sun Tzu's, The Art of War" (8 Jun 66)
- (8) Fact Sheet #9 "Religions in Vietnam" (8 Jun 66)
- (9) Fact Sheet #10 "The Inspector General Redress of Complaints" (30 Jul 66)
- (10) Fact Sheet #11 "Legal Assistance and Personal Affairs Information for the Serviceman" (30 Jul 66)
- (11) Fact Sheet #12 "Traffic Guides for Vehicle Operation in Vietnam" (30 Jul 66)

d. Required orientations, films and directives have been conducted, shown and prepared in addition to daily pick-up in Saigon and

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distribution of the Stars and Stripes for this headquarters.

e. The arrival in June of the 16th Photographic Detachment and its attachment to the 53d Signal Battalion has provided the required augmented photographic capability the Information Office must have to accomplish the mission. Although the 16th Photographic Detachment does not have a processing and reproduction capability, they are well supported by the 53d Signal Battalion's photo processing laboratory. The cameramen of the 16th Photographic Detachment provide excellent photographs and the processed prints provided by the 53d Signal Battalion are done in a highly professional manner. At the present time, in coordination with the 53d Signal Battalion, the 16th Photographic Detachment has as its primary mission the photographic support of the Information Office.

f. The concept of this office is to give full publicity support to all units under the operational control of this headquarters. Therefore, several information teams (press and audio) have been sent to support various units, tactical operations and civic action activities.

### 7. (U) Inspector General.

During the reporting period, the Inspector General received one complaint (unjustified), nine requests for assistance and conducted two investigations. No trends were indicated as a result of these actions.

### 8. (U) Civil Affairs/Psychological Operations.

#### a. Civil Affairs.

(1) The Revolutionary Development Program was supported by all units throughout III Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ). Projects implemented include construction and repair of roads, classrooms, wells, latrines, dispensaries, fences, dikes, canals and dams.

(2) The US Agency for International Development (USAID) is working closely with III Corps units and advisors to assist the Revolutionary Development Programs. USAID has provided cement, reinforcing bars and roofing tin to be used in the construction of schools, dispensaries and other structures in villages and hamlets throughout III CTZ. Large quantities of Bulgar wheat and cooking oil have been distributed as well as items from CARE, Catholic Relief Services and other in-country relief organizations. Over 600 metric tons of commodities were air lifted by USAID to Phuoc Long Province during the month of June to support the populace because road convoys could not get into the area safely.

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(3) Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) activities included support for Operations Birmingham, Hardihood, Lam Son II and El Paso II and III to wit; 350,000 copies of one-page newspapers that contained articles comparing life under communism with a free society plus the reasons for US involvement in Vietnam; one million leaflets explaining US and GVN policy for building a free Vietnamese society; 220,000 JUSPAO publications including Hong Que, A Nation's Progress and Building a New Society; 150 assorted street banners heralding the accomplishments of the GVN; 1 1/2 million "victory print" rice bags; Civic Action School signs; 1,000 posters; GVN national flags; plus PSYOP guidance on appropriate use of themes and information media. During the period, at the request of the Brigade Chief of Staff, JUSPAO II FFORCEV representatives lectured to new replacements of the 173d Airborne Brigade (Sep) on the history and culture of the Vietnamese people and emphasized how US troops can promote, by personal example, US National objectives. JUSPAO also responded to a 1st Infantry Division request to evaluate the methods used to encourage Quy Chanhs to rally from VC main force units.

(4) Vietnamese acceptance of the presence of FWMF troops was advanced appreciably through the MEDCAP II program. During the reporting period, over 76,600 patients were treated within III CTZ. About one fourth of the patients were ARVN or RF/PF dependents. Typical civic action projects currently in progress by brigade size units are shown in a weekly Civic Action Report (24-30 July) of the 173d Airborne Brigade (Separate) at inclosure 13.

(5) Installation Coordinators conducted monthly community relations meetings with representatives of local units to discuss problems within their areas of concern. The minutes of the Bien Hoa Community Relations Meetings for May, June, and July are shown in inclosure 14, 15, and 16.

## b. Psychological Operations.

(1) During the quarter, a total of 246 leaflet and loud-speaker missions were flown in support of US Tactical Units in III CTZ. The availability of U-10 and AC-47 aircraft during the period was not sufficient to meet the demand. This shortage of aircraft was caused mainly by maintenance problems.

(2) The 12th Aviation Group supported US units in PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS when aircraft of the 5th Air Commando Squadron were not available.

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(3) A total of 15,650,000 leaflets were dropped in support of US ground operations. An additional 11,335,000 leaflets were dropped to support combined ARVN-US operations during this period (examples at incl 17). In addition, approximately 900 hours of loudspeaker time were logged.

(4) On 21 June, the 1st Infantry Division received a 1250W multilith printing press on a trial basis. During the remainder of June and the month of July, this press printed 2,570,000 leaflets which were distributed by the 1st Division in support of tactical operations. The evaluation of this press and method of utilization is continuing.

(5) From 1 May - 31 July 1966, a total of 746 Viet Cong rallied to GVN-US/FWMAF units. Especially notable were the 47 ralliers in Hau Nghia Province and the 34 in Binh Duong Province. The increase in ralliers in these provinces can be attributed in part to increased tactical operations conducted by US Forces.

(6) The 246th PSYOP Company supported US/FWMAF units under operational control of II FFORCEV with seven mobile loudspeaker teams. These teams, attached at brigade level prior to and during operations, furnished assistance in selecting target audiences, developing themes for leaflets and tapes, and distributing preplanned leaflets and tapes in the area of operations.

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SECTION II: COMMANDERS OBSERVATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION

Item: Visual Aerial Reconnaissance.

Discussion: Prior to the publication of II FFORCEV Regulation 381-1, Military Intelligence, Visual Aerial Reconnaissance, in June 1966 policies had not been established nor specific responsibilities fixed for the conduct of an organized and effective visual aerial reconnaissance program by units under operational control of this headquarters.

Observation: This regulation has accomplished these goals by instituting such a program. A central agency must coordinate all VR assets to allow a more complete coverage of the CTZ daily. Additionally this allows emphasis to be placed on certain aspects of the program, i. e. night VR.

✓ Item: Sensors. Side Looking Airborne Radar (SLAR).

Discussion: The value of SLAR can only be realized when you know what is moving and what direction it is moving. It is of little value to fly SLAR over areas where normal movement would be expected up to a certain hour. Due to the timeliness of the information gained, SLAR targets must be exploited immediately.

ACST

Observation: In determining what is moving and exploiting this movement rapidly, the use of SLAR aircraft followed up by "light ships" and "gun ships" to illuminate and eliminate a target has proven extremely effective. The SLAR will locate the movement after dark, the "light ship" allows proper identification of the target and the "gun ship" is on call to act if necessary. This procedure allows the user to gain maximum benefit from his SLAR program. Identification of convoys is meaningless unless direction of movement can be determined. To gain maximum benefit from such identification, two passes of the SLAR ship over the target must be made. This will allow ground or air interdiction to be made at the appropriate location.

✓ Item: Sensors. Infrared Activities.

Discussion: The significance of infrared operations is directly proportional to the information derived from the readout. With the continual change of areas of operation, recipients of infrared information have difficulty in establishing a data base for their particular area with which to evaluate results. The identification of friendly and enemy emissions is exceedingly difficult in this type of environment and the problem is further complicated by flying infrared missions over populated areas prior to curfew.

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Observation: To properly evaluate an infrared readout, one must know the area and the time over target. Also there must be a data base of infrared activities for the area. In a rapidly moving situation where areas of operation change frequently, the best way to evaluate infrared information is to reconnoiter the target area visually and continually. One must look for objects that yield hot returns (e. g., charcoal ovens throughout the area) and be aware of their existence. Early morning visual reconnaissance over areas that appear to be significant can often provide the actual basis for the emissions.

Item: Inability to determine if a particular report was supplied by an agent who had furnished reliable information in the past.

Discussion: In the past, reports were received with the source of the information being listed as a coded source, or an informant. This system provided no way to establish the source's reliability as no two reports could be credited to the same individual. Action was taken to have each agency identify these sources by a code number. While this system is not completely in operation, over 70 per cent of the sources are now identified by a code number.

With the establishment of code numbers, the II FFORCEV Intelligence Center has established a dossier on each source. Further, as each report is received, the agent's code number is plotted on a map in the area where the information was obtained. Through the constant review of INSTUMS, Spot Reports, Aerial Reconnaissance Reports, agent reports and personal contact with tactical troops, the source's information is checked and crosschecked to determine if the information reported is accurate, thereby establishing the degree of reliability of each individual source. By the end of the reporting period, due to the newness of the program and the lack of sufficient numbers of agent reports from any particular agent, the actual reliability of any one source has not yet been established. However, in several instances trends are starting to develop.

Observation: As the reliability of these sources is established, the Intelligence Center will be able to assist commanders by being able to supply a record of the past performance of the particular agent and to what degree his information was accurate. As the program develops, the Center will be able to receive requests for specific EEI from a commander, make a review of the sources available who could fulfill the requirement, and then levy the EEI.

Item: Inability of agents to read maps.

Discussion: The agents have given coordinates and state that what they

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observed was on a hill; however, upon checking, it was found that the coordinates were in a valley between two hills. In other cases, agents will give coordinates of a particular village, and in many cases the coordinates are as much as 1000 meters in error.

Observation: Agents need additional training in map reading, and their reports should be checked for accuracy by their American counterparts.

## OPERATIONS/TRANSPORTATION

Item: Reception of new units (planning and implementation of plans.).

Discussion: The arrival of new units "in-country" and their effective integration into the force structure can become an activity of critical proportion.

Observation: Upon the arrival of advance parties of incoming units, a planning conference attended by the advance party, the II FFORCEV Engineer, II FFORCEV G4, 1st Logistical Command representatives and representatives of the host unit should be held in order to clarify logistics problems and to find solutions to the problems presented. These early conferences are a necessity in achieving a favorable logistical posture for the incoming unit.

Item: Dependence on air line of communication (LOC) during monsoon season.

Discussion: Tactical operations based solely, or primarily, on air LOC can become difficult to support owing to poor flying conditions or deterioration of the laterite airstrips.

Observation: Ideally, select a forward support area (FSA) that can be reached by both air and land LOC.

Item: Airlift coordination meetings.

Discussion: Airlift of troops, equipment and supplies often becomes a critical factor during the conduct of an overall tactical operation (e.g., EL PASO II).

Observation: Coordination meetings held during the planning stages of an operation between the ground tactical unit, II FFORCEV, USAF and support elements (e.g., 1st Logistical Command) help to reduce the number of emergency airlift requests submitted during a tactical operation.

Item: Identification and protection of cargo of new units.

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Discussion: Experience acquired by monitoring and assisting the arrival of new units from COMUS indicates that the initial identification and subsequent protection of ocean cargo is one of the most troublesome phases of their integration into the force structure.

Observation: The following three measures, taken by the unit prior to departure from COMUS, will reduce to a minimum the problem area discussed above:

- a. Staff officers, advance party members, unit commanders and supply personnel should learn in detail the names of vessels their cargo is on, the ports and dates of embarkation and debarkation and the unit "project code".
- b. At least one member of the unit should sail on the vessel moving the unit cargo.
- c. Project codes should be marked prominently on all containers.

Item: USAF Air Movement Control teams (proposed).

Discussion: A requirement exists to add further flexibility to the nature of control presently exercised by Airlift Command Center (ALCC) over USAF airlift missions so that the senior ground force commander (e.g., division commander) can get a rapid diversion of allocated aircraft from one off-load field to a different one. An operation against a guerilla force is often a case of "reaction" to a specific contact as opposed to preplanned airlift. This causes troops and supplies to be moved on an emergency basis. The time required to divert aircraft from planned or programmed airlift to emergency requirements now averages about three hours, due in part to existing request channels and encoding requirements (See incl 19).

Observation: This problem is presently under study by this headquarters and USARV J3.

Item: During the period covered, Air Force airlift was utilized as follows:

<u>MONTH</u>	<u>PAY</u>	<u>TOTAL S/T</u>
May	4921	2524
June	8239	7467.7
July	6721	8864.6

Discussion: The above figures are based, where possible, on actual recorded

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tonnage lifted. However, when compiling figures for passengers and vehicles, the tonnage is usually based only on the requested amount due to a lack of available information.

In spite of possible inaccuracies, the figures indicate an increasing utilization of Air Force airlift to achieve "battlefield mobility" for units not organically equipped to be airmobile. This increased utilization carries with it certain inherent problems which will be discussed in "Items", below.

Observation: As the tempo of U. S. offensive action increases, it can be expected that the distances from existing base camps will also increase. Unless the security of existing roads also increases, tactical deployment and resupply activities will become increasingly dependent on Air Force airlift.

Item: Overcommitment of airlift.

Discussion: As noted above, the utilization of Air Force airlift has increased steadily during the period covered. At the same time available Air Force planes have remained relatively unchanged, resulting in an overcommitment of assets.

It has become increasingly apparent that the available assets are approaching saturation. This has been underscored by the increasing number of "postponed" and "carryover" missions which cannot be completed due to a shortage of aircraft. In addition, it is often necessary to upgrade troop movements from "priority 1" to "combat essential" in order to complete the mission within desired time limits.

Observation: A shortage of Air Force planes will be a steadily increasing problem; and requests will necessarily be completed as priority demands. Commanders should be aware that the availability of airlift is becoming a major planning consideration. When possible, problem areas should be resolved at planning conferences prior to major operations.

Item: Validity of airlift requests.

Discussion: In recent operations, several cases of invalid airlift requests have come to light, causing either "wasted" aircraft availability or extensive delay in completion of the mission.

The Air Force allocates aircraft based on the type and amount of cargo requested to be moved. In one instance, a mission was estimated as 22 C-130 sorties, but because of unlisted cargo to be moved, 39 sorties

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were required to complete the mission. In another case, a request was made to move a battalion by Air Force airlift. Four aircraft were allocated for this purpose. Concurrently, Army aircraft also were dispatched and had moved about half the cargo. The result was the use of four aircraft to fill a request that could have been fulfilled by two aircraft.

Finally, the use of unnecessarily high priority requests, especially emergency priorities, results in a degradation of the priority system, which in turn results in a reduced utilization of available airlift.

Observation: In order to have a reasonable amount of airlift available for emergencies, commanders and staff officers must exercise restraint in order not to degrade the priority system. Additionally, more accurate estimation of requirements is indicated.

Item: Reduced Capability of Airfields.

Discussion: On several occasions, especially Operation EL PASO, the inability of a given airfield to handle required traffic has created a critical situation.

The reduction of airfield capability was caused by several items:

a. Airfield congestion due to helicopter traffic in and around the "airlift" origin or destination airfield. This usually combines with minimum air traffic control at forward airfields to create safety hazards, and has resulted in two incidents and one major accident involving "contact" between fixed wing and rotary wing aircraft.

b. Weather: The onset of the monsoon season has turned several airfields, fully suitable for heavy use during dry weather, into "seas of mud", thus causing the airfields to be closed or at least reducing the capability below that necessary to sustain the operation.

Observation: When planning operations from forward airfields, considerable weight should be given to the capability of the airfield under all weather conditions and to the use of adequate air traffic control to reduce airfield congestion.

## SUPPLY/MAINTENANCE

Item: Cargo Slings and nets.

Discussion: The requirements to lift external loads such as artillery

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pieces, ammunition, brass, or other bulk supplies is paramount. Cargo slings and nets have always been in short supply. The bag, cargo, aerial delivery, A-22, using appropriate aerial delivery slings, will serve the same purpose as the cargo nets for transporting external loads. The 173d Airborne Brigade has consistently used the A-22 container for this purpose and other units are now placing them on requisition. It is better to make the sling set OVE to the artillery piece as opposed to the helicopter.

Observation: Tactical units deploying to Vietnam should ascertain the availability of in-country assets of these two items prior to departing CONUS; insure an adequate supply is available or take necessary action to obtain them prior to departure.

✓ Item: Rapid refueling of helicopters.

Discussion: A rapid refueling capability for helicopters supporting tactical operations is mandatory. A flight of 16 helicopters should be able to land and be refueled simultaneously without shutting down the engines. There are several pumping systems with filter units that can be rigged to meet this requirement. The MINIPORT SERVICING SYSTEM with four outlets and the KENCO pump (100 gal per minute) with two outlets are favored. Of these two systems, the KENCO system is considered more satisfactory for highly mobile operations in that this system can be transported by UH-1 helicopter. Neither of these items have been available in sufficient quantity to satisfy total needs. This shortage has caused considerable difficulty in that it has been necessary to shift available assets from unit to unit to support operations.

Observation: Incoming units that will be involved in conducting airmobile operations should make every effort to obtain these items in sufficient quantity prior to departing CONUS.

✓ Item: 600 gallon water purification set.

Discussion: The 600 gallon set is more desirable than the 1500 gallon set for tactical operations in Vietnam. Most operations are conducted in areas inaccessible to land LOC's and the 1500 gallon set is not air transportable by aircraft capable of using airfields in those areas. Therefore, it has been found that the 600 gallon set is far more suitable for airmobile operations in Vietnam.

Observation: Units should make an effort to obtain at least one 600 gallon water purification set per brigade prior to departing CONUS.

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Item: Organizational Maintenance.

Discussion: Detachment size units arriving in-country without organic maintenance capabilities, and assigned to II FFORCEV, have difficulty in obtaining required organizational maintenance support. Lack of organizational maintenance support capability has caused an unacceptable deadline rate.

Observation: Units without organizational maintenance capability must be satellited on another unit capable of furnishing this support immediately upon arrival of its equipment. (See item on "Reception of new units", page 18).

## MEDICAL

✓ Item: Surgical Augmentation of Division Medical Service.

Discussion: During two (2) operations (BIRMINGHAM and EL PASO II), the clearing company providing normal division medical service was augmented by a surgical detachment (KA). This detachment consists of a general surgeon, an assistant surgeon, an anesthesiologist, an operating room nurse (male) and enlisted operating room specialists. This unit is fully equipped. This addition provided a surgical capability not normally available at clearing company level. T56

Observation: Surgical augmentation of the clearing company provides a forward "small surgical hospital". It is of particular value in distant operations where resuscitative surgery may be required prior to long air evacuation to a fixed hospital. It appears that this type augmentation provides the tactical unit an adequate surgical capability without the added logistical problem of moving a standard surgical hospital.

## LOGISTICS/SUPPLY & MAINTENANCE

✓ Item: Climatological Effects upon Thermo Copy Paper.

Discussion: The high temperatures and humidity unfavorably affect Thermo Copy paper and greatly reduce the usable time it may be stored. The high temperatures, in effect, "burn" the paper in the same manner as does a Thermo Copy machine in a short period of storage time unless the paper is stored in an air-conditioned area. D5648

Observation: If Thermo Copy paper cannot be stored in an air-conditioned area, it should be stored in small quantities to prevent deterioration

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caused by high temperatures and humidity.

Item: Supply and Maintenance of Office Equipment.

Discussion: Missions and functions in the administrative area require the use of complex office equipment. There is, however, no firm program for maintenance or supplies for this equipment.

Observation: Support-echelons should consider establishment of supply and maintenance programs for the various types of office equipment.

Item: Assumption of Post, Camp, and Station Activities at Field Force Level.

Discussion: When a unit of Field Force level is deployed to an overseas area in a tactical environment, there is not always a support activity upon which to rely for Post, Camp and Station functions such as civilian personnel, billeting, protocol, special services and welfare activities. This necessitates an assumption of these activities by the various staff agencies, often with limited personnel, resulting in possible diminishment of effectiveness.

Observation: Units of Field Force level should be prepared upon arrival at an overseas location in a tactical environment without a support activity to assume various Post, Camp and Station activities necessary for effective functioning of the headquarters.

### CIVIL AFFAIRS

Item: Coordination of CA/PSYOP between II FFORCEV and USAID/JUSPAO Military Representatives.

Discussion: Initially coordination between II FFORCEV and USAID/JUSPAO representatives was done by telephone or required considerable travel time between the distant locations of the respective offices. Daily briefings, Staff Planning Conferences, and situations that required immediate coordination were at times difficult to arrange because of the distance between the agencies. Office space and equipment were made available to JUSPAO for collocation of their military representative with II FFORCEV, G5. JUSPAO military representative and G5 are now collocated thus enhancing the coordination and operation under the "Country Team" concept. The possibility of collocation of the USAID military representative is being explored.

Observation: Collocation of G5 and JUSPAO military representative materially enhances necessary coordination between these agencies.

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Item: Commander's Recommendations.

NONE.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

*Robert J. Alderman*  
ROBERT J. ALDERMAN  
Major, AGC  
Asst AG

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Units Attached/Assigned or under OPCON of II FFORCEV 1 May-31 July 1966

UNIT	GAIN	LOCATION	DATE
Q & HQ CO II FFORCEV (Assigned)	10 Jan 66	LONG BINH	1 May - 31 Jul
Q & HQ Btry II FFORCEV Arty (Assigned)	17 Jan 66	LONG BINH	1 May - 31 Jul
1st Inf Div (OPCON)	15 Mar 66	DI AN	1 May - 31 Jul
45th Inf Div (-) (OPCON)	22 Mar 66	CU CHI	1 May - 31 Jul
73d Abn Bde (Sep) (OPCON)	22 Mar 66	BIEN HOA	1 May - 31 Jul
12th Avn Gp (OPCON)	15 Mar 66	TAN SON NHUT LONG BINH	1 May - 30 Jun 1 Jul - 31 Jul
29th Chem Det (Attached)	10 Mar 66	LONG BINH	1 May - 31 Jul
23d Arty Gp (OPCON)	15 Mar 66	PHU LOI	1 May - 31 Jul
7th Mil His Det (Attached)	1 Jun 66	FT Riley, Kansas Enroute to RVN LONG BINH	1 May - 22 May 23 May - 24 May 25 May - 31 Jul
6th PI Det (Attached)	4 Jun 66	LONG BINH	4 Jun - 31 Jul
17th RRU (Attached)	8 Jun 66	LONG BINH	8 Jun - 31 Jul
49th Sig Det (Attached)	1 Jun 66	LONG BINH	1 Jun - 31 Jul
53d Sig Bn (OPCON)	4 Jun 66	LONG BINH	4 Jun - 31 Jul
61st Med Det (Attached)	25 Jun 66	LONG BINH	23 Jun - 31 Jul
219th MI Det (Attached)	20 May 66	LONG BINH	9 May - 31 Jul

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Units Attached/Assigned or under OPCON of II FFGCV 1 May-31 July 1966


<u>UNIT</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>DATE</u>
1st Engr Det (attached)	4 Jun 66	LONG BINH	4 Jun - 31 Jul

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## Description and Recapitulation of Enemy Order of Battle

### 1. (C) Description.

a. The III Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) includes all or part of four Viet Cong major military/political subdivisions known as military regions (MR). The military regions concerned have been designated MR 6, 7, and 8 and the Saigon Cholon Gia Dinh Special Zone (SCGDSZ) which is of equal status with the military regions. Two provinces of the VC MR 6, Phuoc Long and Binh Tuy, are included in III CTZ. All of the VC MR 7 and the SCGDSZ lie within the III CTZ. Long An and part of Hau Nghia Provinces belong to VC MR 8 and are included within III Corps boundaries. The SCGDSZ includes the GVN Capital Military District (Gia Dinh Province) plus an extension running to the northwest along National Highway 1 which is 20 km long and about 20 km wide. Military Regions 7, 8 and 9 and the SCGDSZ have recently been redesignated by the VC as MR 1 through 4 respectively. MR 6 remaining unchanged. For the sake of simplicity, the old more familiar MR designations will be used below.

b. The VC control two important base areas within the III CTZ. The first is the Duong Minh Chau, or War Zone "C", in northern Tay Ninh Province and the site of the headquarters of the communist insurgent effort designated the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN). The second major base area is war zone "D" which lies mostly within northwestern Long Khanh Province and where the headquarters of MR 7 is located.

c. The VC provinces of Military Region 7 and those portions of Military Regions 6 & 8 located in the III CTZ have organized 32 Local Force Companies and 28 LF Platoons that operate in III CTZ.

d. Five VC Provinces have six confirmed Local Force Battalions. These battalions are:

<u>Local Force Battalions</u>	<u>VC Province</u>
Phu Loi Bn	Binh Duong
2d Independant Bn	Long An
506th Bn	Long An
320th Bn	Tay Ninh
186th Bn	Binh Tuy
860th Bn	Phuoc Tuy

e. There are eight Viet Cong Main Force infantry regiments, three NVA regiments and one artillery regiment normally operating within the III CTZ. The SCGDSZ (MR 4) controls the 165A Regiment. MR 8 directs

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the Dong Thap II Regiment in Long An Province. The 9th VC Division Headquarters controls the 274 and 275 Regiments for Military Region 7. COSVN directs the activities of the 70th Security Regiment, the U.80 Artillery Regiment and the 9th VC Division which is composed of the 271, 272 and 273 Regiments.

f. The three NVA regiments, the 101st Regiment/325 Div, the 141st Regiment/312 Div and the 250th Regiment were infiltrated into the III Corps Area during the reporting period. The 141st Regiment was engaged by the 101st Airborne Brigade during the first part of May in the vicinity of Bu Gia Map (YU 3835) on Operation AUSTIN VI. Captured documents and a PW indicated the 101st Regiment was moving through Phuoc Long Province in May. It is now located in northeastern Tay Ninh Province. The 250th Regiment evidently moved into War Zone "D" from Quang Duc Province with a reported six battalions. Reports indicate several of the battalions have been used to replace and fill out main force VC regiments. The remainder of the regiment is currently unlocated.

g. See incl 7 for sketch map of enemy locations as of 1 May 1966, and incl 8 for locations as of 31 July 1966.

## 2. (C) Summary of Recent Activities.

a. May marked the opening of the VC Monsoon Campaign. The 9th VC Division had two regiments, the 271st and 273d, in War Zone "D" and the 272d in War Zone "C" in April. Possibly to counter the threat to War Zone "C" posed by the US 1st Division on Operation Birmingham, the 9th VC Division Headquarters moved into eastern Tay Ninh Province following the 271st and 273d Regiments. These units closed into their new locations the first week in May. The first two or three weeks were a period of relative inactivity until it was determined that the 1st Infantry Division was ending its operations in Tay Ninh and was beginning a series of search and destroy operations in northeastern Binh Duong Province.

b. On 18 May, a CIDG force made contact with at least one battalion of the 273d Regiment west of Loc Ninh. The 1st Infantry Division moved a brigade force north to Loc Ninh. The 9th VC Division avoided further contact, possibly awaiting reinforcements or assistance from the NVA regiments reportedly moving in Phuoc Long Province.

c. On 6 June the 272d Regiment began the first of six significant contacts with the 1st Infantry Division and CIDG units in Binh Long Province. Dates of contact and VC losses are summarized below:

DATE	COORDINATES	UNIT	VC CASUALTIES		
			KIA (BC)	KIA (POSS)	VCC
8 June	XT 771745	272 Regt	105	230	1

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DATE	COORDINATES	UNIT	VC CASUALTIES		
			KIA (BC)	KIA (POSS)	VCC
11 June	XT 710010 (Hwy 13)	273 Regt	98	150	1
18 June	XU 590035 (M Force)	271 Regt	11	Unk	0
30 June	XU 723020 (Hwy 13)	271 Regt	270	300	7
2 July	XU 607018	273 Regt	46	150	0
9 July	XT 660730	272 Regt	239	300	9
			769	1130	18

d. It is notable that each regiment was contacted twice during the period. After only one month recuperation period from its bloody losses of 8 June, the 272d Regiment attacked for the second time. NVA captives from the 9 July action indicated they were recently assigned to the 272d Regiment. The availability of trained replacements was credited with enabling the VC units to shorten their recovery time after heavy battle losses.

e. Regiments of the 5th VC Division located in Phuoc Tay Province avoided direct contact with the US 173d Airborne Brigade during Operations Hardihood and Hollandia in May and June, choosing to attack twice during Operation Yorktown. On 29 June, the 173d made contact with a company from the 308th Bn, 274th VC Regiment at XT 580000. The following day, 30 June, the ARVN 4/52 Regiment and 3/43d Regiment encountered elements from the 274th Regiment on Highway 1 south of Gia Ray. Since this action, it appears that the 5th VC Division has shifted its attention to the 1st RTZ north of Phuoc Le in Phuoc Tay Province.

f. The Dong Thap II Regiment (-) (the 271st Bn normally operates in the northern portion of IV CTZ) avoided direct confrontation by moving west into the "Plain of Reeds", probably as a result of several operations along the Vam Co Dong River in Hau Nghia Province. The 267 and 265 Bns participated in the attack on Duc Hue on 27 May. Both battalions and the regimental headquarters are now located in the vicinity of the Cambodian border of Hau Nghia.

g. The seven battalions of the 165A Regiment continued harassment of the Capital Military District, the Cu Chi area and the Di An area throughout the period. The Seventh Battalion was accepted as "confirmed" in the first part of July. The 4th and 5th battalions have been increasing their activity in the latter part of July, primarily in the western and southern portions of the Gia Dinh District. The US 25th Division made contact with the 3d Company of the 1st Bn in the Ho Bo woods area on 19 July.

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h. The C-230 Battalion, formerly assigned as security guard for COSVN, was absorbed when the VC formed the 70th Security Regiment of three battalions. This regiment was accepted as "confirmed" in the middle part of June. A battalion from the 70th Regiment is believed to have attacked the CIDG Camp at Trại B1 (XT 1270) on 23 July using 70mm Chicomack howitzers.

i. The local force battalions have generally avoided decisive contact throughout the period. The US 25th Infantry Division had contacts with companies from the 5th Long An unit and the 320th Tay Ninh Battalion during the first part of May. The 10th ARVN Division had a short contact with a company of the 860th Bn (Phuoc Tuy) in June. The US 173d Airborne Brigade discovered a bunker used by a weapons platoon of the 860th during Operation Yorktown. The Phu Loi Battalion may have participated in an ambush of a company of the 1/8 ARVN Regiment on Highway 13 in July.

## 5. (C) Tactics.

a. The VC are apparently using battalions and regiments for individual operations, being wary of massing and attacking in multiregimental strength. They are still attempting to use "hugging" tactics by staying close to the enemy in an effort to reduce the effects of close air and artillery support. When not engaged, the VC appear to be dispersing their units over larger areas and digging bunkers for supply and command installations to lessen the effects of B-52 strikes and Sky Spot bombings.

b. The VC have also increased their use of small arms and machine guns in antiaircraft defense. On several occasions, the VC have used weapons emplaced in groups around an open area.

c. Two plans for ambushing relieving forces have been captured, demonstrating the VC doctrine that planning for an attack of a force is not complete until measures have been taken to counter any attempts at relief. These measures may include using a portion of the VC force in ambush positions along the most likely route of approach or helicopter landing zone, or using a coordinated mortar attack on garrisons and headquarters in the vicinity which would most likely dispatch relief forces. Usually the principal objective of an attack is to ambush the relief force.

d. The captured plans also show the importance of the "preparation of the battlefield" which includes stockpiling of supplies, extensive planning and detailed reconnaissance. This contributes to the apparent short reaction time of one or two days before a force is moved into position for an ambush or an attack.

e. In Long An and Hau Nghia Provinces and the Capital Military

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District, the VC have increased the number of small unit attacks on Regional/Popular Forces, outposts and ARVN garrisons. Harassing fire, to include mortars, has been used in simultaneous attacks on several outposts. These minor attacks are an effort to challenge GVN control and appear also to be a part of the VC plan to intimidate the civilian population from participating in the forthcoming elections.

f. For trends in certain enemy tactics and techniques, see incl 9 thru 12.

#### 4. (C) VC Battle Losses.

VC battle losses inflicted by US units between 1 May 1966 and 31 July 1966 are tabulated below:

<u>KIA (BC)</u>	<u>KIA (Pos)</u>	<u>VCC</u>	<u>VXE</u>	<u>SA</u>	<u>Hvy Wpns</u>	<u>Mines &amp; Demo</u>
1990	2632	189	1435	1944	16	1083

<u>Rds Ammo</u>	<u>Bldg</u>	<u>Tons of Grain</u>
74,528	1434	2486.69

#### 5. (C) Enemy Capabilities and Vulnerabilities.

##### a. Enemy Capabilities.

(1) Despite suffering heavy losses of personnel and materiel during May, June and July, the Viet Cong retains significant attack capabilities in III CTZ.

(a) The presence of the 271st, 272d and 273d Regiments give the VC the capability of attacking target areas in Tay Ninh, Binh Long and Binh Duong Provinces. Likely specific targets are Loc Ninh, Tri Tan and Trai Bi CIDG/SF Camp; in addition, the VC will take advantage of targets of opportunity.

(b) Elements of the 141st NVA Regiment were last identified in Phuoc Long Province on 11 May. There have been four reports of elements of the 141st possibly moving into War Zone "D". The possible location of the 141st furnishes the VC an attack capability in Phuoc Long and Northern Long Khanh Provinces.

(c) The location of the 274th and 275th Regiments, 5th VC Division, in Phuoc Tuy Province gives the VC the capability to attack selected targets in Phuoc Tuy and southern Long Khanh Province. Enhancing this capability is the possible location of the 250th NVA Regiment in southern War Zone "D".

(d) The 165A and Dong Thap II Regiments are capable of

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attacking targets in Ben Nghia and Long An Provinces and in the Capital Military District. Based on past actions involving these units, attacks will probably be battalion size operations.

(2) Possible infiltration of additional NVA units from Cambodia must be considered in the VC reinforcement capability. These units could be both unit and individual replacements.

(3) The VC can defend their bases and so-called safe areas with all or part of the forces listed in paragraphs 4a(1) and (2) above.

(4) The VC can withdraw or continue to avoid contact within or outside of III CTM after exercising any one of the above capabilities.

## b. Discussion and Analysis of Enemy Capabilities.

### (1) Attack Capability.

(a) Binh Long Province. Elements of the 9th VC Division were last contacted on 9 July in Binh Long Province. The lack of reports on the movement of these units would tend to indicate that they are still in Binh Long Province near the Cambodian border. Considering the recuperative capability previously demonstrated by the Viet Cong, the 9th Division, with the possible exception of the 272d Regiment, is ready for further combat operations. The 9th Division, together with the possible presence of the 101st NVA Regiment, presents a definite threat to northern Binh Long Province. A document captured on 14 July indicated that COSV had ordered the Chau Thanh District (Binh Duong Province) Forward Supply Council and Military Committee to dispatch a second group of laborers and one-third of the district's guerilla force to southern Binh Long Province for a two month period (apparently July and August). This second group of laborers were replacements for a group that had finished its service on 27 June. The new group was to report to the Chau Thanh District Communications and Liaison Committee no later than 7 July. The addition of local guerillas to the labor force indicates a possible need for local security to guard laborers, a shortage of civilian laborers, or a requirement of additional guerilla forces for combat support of main force operations. This document, together with present 9th Division troop dispositions, indicates that the VC have not abandoned their plans for conducting offensive operations against troops and installations in the An Loc - Loc Ninh area.

(b) Binh Tuy, Long Khanh and Lam Dong Provinces. A report indicated the possibility that large VC units were located in Lam Dong Province; however, the 173d Airborne Brigade, operating along route 20 and into Lam Dong Province, had only scattered and sporadic contact with small groups of VC. Likewise, the 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, operating in the vicinity of Vo Dat and Gia Ray, has had no significant contact. On 22 July, an agent reported that an estimated two VC

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battalions had recently conducted training exercises in the area of May Tao Mountain (YB 785895). Another report indicated that a number of civilian laborers have been transporting rice from May Tao Mountain to the vicinity of Hiep Hoa (YB 880838). Agents dispatched to investigate and report on the area have not returned. May Tao is confirmed to be a base area for North Viet 5.

(c) Phuoc Tuy Province. The probable location of the 274th and 275th Regiments in Phuoc Tuy Province indicates a possible threat to the 1st ATF. There have been reports of VC battalions being in the vicinity of the 1st ATF TAO, and reconnaissance and contacts have partially confirmed these reports. Several recently abandoned company size base camps have been found, however, and on 25 July the 6th RAR engaged an estimated VC company. On 29 July four CH-47's received intense small arms and automatic weapons fire in the vicinity YB 4068 where an earlier report had indicated a dug in VC battalion. However, later reconnaissance of the area indicated only small groups of VC. Documents found on a VC body identified the 860th Local Force Battalion. It is likely that small VC reconnaissance and intelligence groups are maintaining surveillance of the 1st ATF while the main force regiments are awaiting a suitable opportunity to attack.

(d) Bien Hoa Province. Small scale attacks and harassments by local force guerilla units continued during the period. Several reports indicated VC activity south of Route 1A and west of Route 15. An ARVN operation conducted in the area had no contact thus indicating the presence of only local forces and guerilla units. On 29 July a FAC reported the termination of a truck route at a stream vicinity YT 084377. Since there is no trail on the other side of the stream, it is believed the VC unload supplies from trucks onto sampans, float the sampans to another canal at YT 128360, where they enter War Zone "D".

(e) Phuoc Long Province. There has been no recent contact in Phuoc Long Province. A visual reconnaissance reported locating a cable across a river vicinity YU 173361. Several meters upstream is a camouflaged pontoon bridge section on each side of the river. Each section is 50 to 75 feet long and 8 to 12 feet wide and is supported by four pontoons. On the north side of the river is a well-used trail being widened but not presently suitable for vehicular traffic. This trail leads to the Cambodian border where it joins a road leading north. These facts indicate a considerable new emphasis on this VC infiltration route. There have been no airstrikes on the bridge due to its proximity to the Cambodian border.

(f) Binh Duong Province. Several reports indicate VC activity west of Xom Cat (YT 1528). Recon teams in the area on 9 July reported seeing well-used trails throughout the area. One report located the D800 VC Battalion, 274th Regiment, in the vicinity. This could be a second D800 Battalion, but it is not likely to be the one subordinate to

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the 274th Regiment. On 24 July, a 1st Infantry Division LRRP reported killing two VC officers vicinity XT 871451. From the immediate reaction of the nearby VC force, it is possible that these were two high-ranking officers. On 26 July, oxcart traffic was reported moving north and south from XT 787410. On 29 July, during a ground follow-up of a B-52 strike, a bag of documents was found vicinity XT 838453. These documents indicated that the target was the commo-liaison or postal transportation facility of the VC Binh Duong Province. Much of the mail was destined for War Zone "D", Eastern Nambo Headquarters and the 272d Regiment. Earlier reports indicated that the 272d Regiment had moved from the vicinity of Binh Thanh and was in the vicinity of the Long Nguyen Secret Zone (XT 7050) in Binh Duong Province. The captured documents also mentioned the Phu Loi Battalion and the 3d Battalion, 165A Regiment. Several reports indicate that the VC are increasing their efforts to harass and interdict Highway 13. The addition of the 272d Regiment would enhance this capability.

(g) Tay Ninh Province. A 5th SF ALO reported 2 1/2 ton trucks transporting supplies along a hard surface road from XT 380850 to XT 542845 indicating the movement of VC supplies within War Zone "C". The presence of the 70th VC Regiment is a continual threat to the Trại Bì CIG/SF Camp. Although this camp was not harassed during last week of July, it is likely that additional harassing attacks will be made soon since the location of Trại Bì disrupts the VC infiltration route into War Zone "C". This camp was established on 22 June 1966, and has been probed or attacked on nine separate occasions.

(h) Capital Military District. A VC senior captain, captured by the 1/50th Infantry (ARVN) on 24 July, stated that he was the commander of A2 Battalion, F-100 (C10) Regiment. This regiment is reportedly a special mission regiment in Saigon. (The C10 Sapper Battalion is accepted as a subordinate unit of the 165A Regiment. There has been no previous indication that this unit has been upgraded to a regiment.) Captured with this officer was a bag of documents which included maps of Saigon and surrounding area, residences of important VN and US personnel, and a detailed intelligence estimate of Tan Son Nhut Airbase. These documents tend to confirm VC intentions of harassing and destroying key installations.

(i) Hau Nghia and Long An Provinces. Viet Cong initiated activity such as harassments, small scale attacks and acts of terrorism increased during the month of July. The VC continue in their efforts to strengthen their influence among the people and are using these methods to make the maximum psychological impact at a minimum cost in material and personnel resources.

(j) Viet Cong ambush and interdiction efforts continued during the period. Reports indicate that road blocks and tax collection points along Highway 13 have made it virtually impossible for rubber plantations to obtain food and supplies necessary for the processing of

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rubber. Twenty road blocks were located along Highway 13 at the end of the reporting period.

### (2) Reinforce Capability.

Reports during the quarter indicated company, battalion and regimental sized VC units infiltrating into III CTZ. Information obtained from a VC captured on 30 June in the Loc Ninh area revealed that the 271st Regiment had been furnished replacements from the 602d Battalion of the 250th Regiment. Since it is believed that the 250th Regiment infiltrated into South Vietnam with six battalions, it is possible that at least three battalions have been retained intact to constitute the 250th Regiment as a tactical entity while the remaining battalions were used as filler. The VC will likely continue to infiltrate NVA units as replacements and reinforcements.

### (3) Defend Capability.

VC initiated incidents during the quarterly period consisted mostly of harassments and small scale attacks. The Viet Cong will likely defend when surprised or when his key bases and command installations are threatened.

### (4) Withdraw Capability.

With few exceptions, most of the period's VC incidents were probably conducted by local force and guerilla unit. The VC will probably continue these tactics until he initiates an offensive at a time and under conditions of his choosing.

### c. Relative Probability of Adoption.

(1) Local force and guerilla units will increase their attacks upon Popular and Regional Force outposts and attempt to weaken GVN influence by harassments and acts of terrorism, particularly in the Capital Military District.

(2) Elements of the 70th Regiment, augmented by local forces, will continue to probe and harass the Trai Bi CIDG/SF Camp. An attack on Trai Bi appears likely.

(3) The 271st and 273d Regiments will continue to harass province and district capitals and SF camps in Binh Long Province. Attacks against An Loc, Loc Ninh, Minh Thanh, Chon Thanh and Suoi Da are likely if US forces are withdrawn from the area.

(4) The 274th Regiment, the 860th (LF) Battalion, and possibly the 275th Regiment may attack the 1st ATF in Phuoc Tuy Province.

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### **d. Vulnerabilities.**


(1) The primary vulnerability of the VC is his inability to cope adequately with aggressive US tactics backed by a technical superiority in all areas, especially artillery and tactical air, plus the mobility provided by the helicopters.

(2) The VC soldier is increasingly more vulnerable to friendly psychological warfare efforts. His successes against ARVN forces have been encouraging, though limited, but he has had no significant successes against US troops. Mounting losses of manpower and materiel have frustrated his efforts and lowered his morale.

e. Conclusions. The most likely areas for VC main force attacks in the near future are Binh Long Province, and possibly Phuoc Tay Province. Small scale attacks will continue in Long An, Hau Nghia, Binh Duong, and Gia Dinh provinces.

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


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Enemy Situation 31 July 1966




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Enemy Attacks




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


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


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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HEADQUARTERS 1750 ALFARU, BRIGADE (SEPARATE)  
APO U.S. Forces 96296

CIVIC ACTION REPORT 24 July 1966 thru 20 July 1966

No	DESCRIPTION	AREA/DISTRICT	UNIT(S) INVOLVED	DATE BEGIN	DATE OR % COMPLETION
1.	Community Relations Boy Scout Troop	Phuc Hai/Duc Tu	1/503d Inf	3 Feb 66	Continuous
2.	Community Relations Soap, CARE package distribution	Binh Luc, Binh Hoa/ Cong Thanh	1/503d Inf	4 Jan 66	Continuous
3.	Health & Sanitation MEDCAP	Binh Luc, Dai An, Thai Hung/Cong Thanh	1/503d Inf	21 Mar 66	Continuous
4.	Health & Sanitation MEDCAP	Binh Luc, Binh Hoa/ Cong Thanh	1/503d Inf	1 Jul 66	Continuous
5.	Education & Training English classes	Binh Hoa/Cong Thanh	1/503d Inf	7 Apr 66	Continuous
6.	Construction Gate	Binh Luc/Cong Thanh	1/503d Inf	19 Jun 66	26 Jul 66
7.	Construction Well	Binh Luc/Cong Thanh	1/503d Inf	12 May 66	90%
8.	Construction One classroom	Binh Luc/Cong Thanh	1/503d Inf	17 Jun 66	9%
9.	Construction Playground equipment	Binh Luc/Cong Thanh	1/503d Inf	12 May 66	50%
10.	Construction Road repair	Binh Luc/Cong Thanh	1/503d Inf	27 May 66	28 Jul 66

# 173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE (SEP) CIVIL ACTION REPORT

No	DESCRIPTION	AREA/DISTRICT	UNIT(S) INVOLVED	DATE BEGON	DATE OR % COMPL
11.	Commerce & Industry Jobs for Vietnamese	Base camp/Luc Tu	1/503d Inf	1 Jan 66	Continuous
12.	Community Relations Lumber distribution	Binh Luc/Cong Thanh	1/503d Inf	1 Jan 66	Continuous
13.	Community Relations Clothing distribution	Binh Luc/Cong Thanh	1/503d Inf	23 May 66	Continuous
14.	Community Relations Big Brother program	Binh Luc/Cong Thanh	1/503d Inf	24 May 66	Continuous
15.	Construction Fence	Binh Luc/Cong Thanh	1/503d Inf	28 May 66	29 Jul 66
16.	Construction Landscaping	Binh Luc/Cong Thanh	1/503d Inf	24 May 66	90%
17.	Construction Latrine	Binh Luc/Cong Thanh	1/503d Inf	29 Jul 66	25%

## NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF PROJECTS

Transportation was provided for the Boy Scouts returning from their three day bivouac. Soap, C&C packages, and school supply kits were distributed. English classes were resumed at the Binh Hoa School. At Binh Luc School, the sidewalk, fence, and gate have been completed; the classroom requires minor work before it is completed. A latrine for the school has been started. The road at Binh Luc was improved by filling in washed out areas. The 1/503d L&CACF team treated 700 persons this week (220 were ARVN dependents). There were 320 persons treated by the DEMCAP team. Two more soldiers have elected to be Big Brothers this week. The Bn continues to employ 86 Vietnamese from the Bien Hoa area.

173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE (SEF) CIVIC ACTION REPORT

<u>No</u>	<u>DESCRIPTION</u>	<u>AREA/DISTRICT</u>	<u>UNIT(S) INVOLVED</u>	<u>DATE BEGUN</u>	<u>DATE OR % COMPL</u>
18.	Health & Sanitation MEDCAP	Loc Lam/Duc Tu	2/503d Inf	17 Jan 66	Continuous
19.	Community Relations Soap distribution	Loc Lam/Duc Tu	2/503d Inf	23 Jun 66	Continuous
20.	Community Relations Milk distribution	Loc Lam, Thanh Hoa/ Duc Tu	2/503d Inf	21 Apr 66	Continuous
21.	Community Relations Aid to TB Hospital	Hanoi/Duc Tu	2/503d Inf	3 May 66	Continuous
22.	Community Relations Food distribution	Hanoi/Duc Tu	2/503d Inf	7 Dec 65	Continuous
23.	Education & Training English classes	Hoa Binh, Hanoi/ Duc Tu	2/503d Inf	3 May 66	Continuous
24.	Commerce & Industry Jobs for Vietnamese	Base camp/Duc Tu	2/503d Inf	1 Jan 66	Continuous
25.	Community Relations Aid to Orphanage	Thanh Hoa/Duc Tu	2/503d Inf	10 Jun 66	Continuous
26.	Transportation Medical	Loc Lam/Duc Tu	2/503d Inf	23 Jun 66	Continuous
27.	Construction Landscaping	Thanh Hoa/Duc Tu	2/503d Inf	27 Jul 66	28 Jul 66
28.	Construction Three classrooms	Hoa Binh/Duc Tu	2/503d Inf	13 Jun 66	90%

# 173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE (SEP) CIVIC ACTION REPORT

No	DESCRIPTION	AREA/DISTRICT	UNIT(S) INVOLVED	DATE BEGUN	DATE OR % COMPL
29.	Construction Playground equipment	Base camp/Duc Tu	2/503d Inf	1 Jul 66	15%

## NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF PROJECTS

The MEDCAP team treated 630 villagers this week. Soap was distributed at the Orphanage and at the Dispensary. Milk and cup cakes which were baked by the Bn were distributed at the Thanh Hoa Orphanage. The students in our English class are progressing very well. The Bn continues to employ 25 Vietnamese. A bulldozer from the 173d Engineer Company was taken to the Orphanage to clear away debris. We provided transportation for three medical patients and one dental patient. The School in Hoa Binh will be finished next week. Construction of the playground equipment has stopped due to faulty equipment.

No	DESCRIPTION	AREA/DISTRICT	UNIT(S) INVOLVED	DATE BEGUN	DATE OR % COMPL
30.	Construction Fence	Tan Phong/Duc Tu	3/319th Arty	25 Jul 66	20%
31.	Construction Well	Tan Phong/Duc Tu	3/319th Arty	22 May 66	90%
32.	Construction latrine	Tan Phong/Duc Tu	3/319th Arty	1 Jan 66	90%
33.	Construction Church repair	Thanh Tam/Duc Tu	3/319th Arty	18 Jul 66	26 Jul 66
34.	Commerce & Industry Jobs for Vietnamese	Base camp/Duc Tu	3/319th Arty	1 Jan 66	Continuous

173D AIRBORNE BRIG DE (SEP) CIVIC ACTION REPORT

NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF PROJECTS

This week our team started building a fence around the School at Tam Phong. Construction on the latrine and well is progressing steadily. The refurbishing of the Church at Thanh Tam has been completed. The 3/319th Arty continues to employ 15 Vietnamese.

No	DESCRIPTION	AREA/DISTRICT	UNIT(S) INVOLVED	DATE BEGUN	DATE OR % COMPL
35.	Health & Sanitation MEDCAP	Cay Da, Ong Huong, Thien Tau, Thai Hung/ Cong Thanh	4/503d Inf	7 Jul 66	Continuous
36.	Community Relations. Food distribution	Ong Huong/Cong Thanh	4/503d Inf	27 Jul 66	Continuous
37.	Commerce & Industry Jobs for Vietnamese	Base camp/Duc Tu	4/503d Inf	12 Jul 66	Continuous
38.	Community Relations ACTT Warehouse detail	Base camp/Duc Tu	4/503d Inf	24 Jul 66	29 Jul 66
39.	Construction Two classrooms	Ong Huong/Cong Thanh	4/503d Inf	8 Feb 66	90%
40.	Construction well	Ong Huong/Cong Thanh	4/503d Inf	28 Jul 66	20%
41.	Construction Latrine	Ong Huong/Cong Thanh	4/503d Inf	29 Jul 66	10%

NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF PROJECTS

The MEDCAP team treated 431 persons this week (91 were RVN/F dependents). The MEDCAP also pulled three teeth. The School at Ong Huong is almost completed. It only lacks painting and the replacement of 4 sheets of tin on the roof. A well and latrine construction for the school has been started this week. Approximately 100 cans of C rations were distributed in Ong Huong. Our unit assisted in the storage of the American Christmas Trucks and Trains project. The Bn is employing 36 Vietnamese.



# 173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE (SEP) CIVIC ACTION REPORT

No	DESCRIPTION	AREA/DISTRICT	UNIT(S) INVOLVED	DATE BEGUN	DATE OR % COMPL
42.	Health & Sanitation MEDCAP	Than Duc, Long Tan, Vinh Hiep, Xom Myong/ Cong Thanh	173d Spt Bn	15 Mar 66	Continuous
43.	Community Relations Food distribution	Vinh Hiep/Cong Thanh	173d Spt Bn	24 Jan 66	Continuous
44.	Community Relations Milk distribution	Loi Hec/Cong Thanh	173d Spt Bn	17 Jan 66	Continuous
45.	Construction Refurbishing Dispensary	Tan Phu/Cong Thanh	173d Spt Bn	26 Apr 66	95%
46.	Construction Latrine	Loi Hec/Cong Thanh	173d Spt Bn	9 May 66	28 Jul 66
47.	Construction Well	Loi Hec/Cong Thanh	173d Spt Bn	9 May 66	50%
48.	Transportation Medevac	Bien Hoa/Duc Tu	173d Spt Bn	26 Jul 66	26 Jul 66
49.	Commerce & Industry Jobs for Vietnamese	Base camp/Duc Tu	173d Spt Bn	1 Jan 66	Continuous
50.	Community Relations School kit distribution	Loi Hec/Cong Thanh	173d Spt Bn	28 Jul 66	28 Jul 66

## NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF PROJECTS

The 173d Spt Bn MEDCAP team treated 1159 patients this week (72 were RVNAF dependents). We also provided dental care for 29 patients. We distributed 28 gallons of cooking oil, 400 pounds of flour, 300 pounds of powdered milk, 32 boxes of oatmeal, 36 cans of beans, and 200 pounds of clothing to the Village of Vinh Hiep. Construction of the Dispensary is nearing completion. This week we

173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE (SEP) CIVIC ACTION REPORT

NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF PROJECTS (Cont'd)

finished work on the latrine. Two patients were evacuated to the Bien Hoa Hospital for surgery. The 173 Support Battalion employs 105 Vietnamese and provides medical care for them. We distributed 44 school kits to the Loi Hoa School.

No	DESCRIPTION	AREA/DISTRICT	UNIT(S) INVOLVED	DATE BEGUN	DATE OR % COMPL
51.	Health & Sanitation MEDCAP	Vinh Cuu, Buu Long, Tan Hiep, Tan Thanh/ Duc Tu	HHC Bde	9 Nov 65	Continuous
52.	Community Relations Magazine distribution	Phuc Hai/Duc Tu	HHC Bde	15 Jan 66	Continuous
53.	Commerce & Industry Jobs for Vietnamese	Base camp/Duc Tu	HHC Bde	1 Jan 66	Continuous
54.	Transportation 3d MASH	Bien Hoa/Duc Tu	HHC Bde	22 Jun 66	Continuous
55.	Construction One room	Tan Hiep/Duc Tu	HHC Bde & III Corp ARVN Ranger Group	22 Jul 66	15%
56.	Construction two classrooms	Khu V/Duc Tu	HHC Bde & III Corp ARVN Ranger Group	9 Jun 66	90%

NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF PROJECTS

The MEDCAP team treated 310 patients this week (60 were RVN/F dependents). An additional 826 patients were treated in the forward area of operation. Magazines were given to the Boy Scouts at Phuc Hai. HHC Bde employs 24 Vietnamese laborers. We plan to finish the school construction at Khu V next week. On Tuesday, we provided transportation for doctors from the 3d MASH to the Bien Hoa Hospital.

# 173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE (SEP) CIVIC ACTION REPORT

No	DESCRIPTION	AREA/DISTRICT	UNIT(S) INVOLVED	DATE BEGUN	DATE OR % COMPL
57.	Education & Training English classes	Vinh Cuu/Duc Tu	Co A (Admin)	30 Nov 65	Continuous
58.	Commerce & Industry Jobs for Vietnamese	Base camp/Duc Tu	Co A (Admin)	1 Jan 66	Continuous
59.	Community Relations Boy Scout Troop	Vinh Cuu/Duc Tu	Co A (Admin)	26 Jul 66	Continuous

## NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF PROJECTS

Attendance dropped off considerably to 6-10 in the adults class and 8-10 in the childrens class. Lesson III was finished this week and lesson IV will be studied next week. We employ 17 Vietnamese who come from the Dien Hoa area. Two GP medium tents w/poles were loaned to one member of the adult class for use on a Boy Scout campout.

No	DESCRIPTION	AREA/DISTRICT	UNIT(S) INVOLVED	DATE BEGUN	DATE OR % COMPL
60.	Construction Two classrooms	Tan Mai/Duc Tu	E/17th Cav 7th ADVN Abn Bn	7 Feb 66	90%
61.	Construction Latrine	Tan Mai/Duc Tu	E/17th Cav	27 Mar 66	95%
62.	Community Relations Lumber distribution	Tan Mai/Duc Tu	E/17th Cav	21 Mar 66	Continuous
63.	Community Relations Milk distribution	Tan Mai/Duc Tu	E/17th Cav	1 May 66	Continuous

# 173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE (SEP) CIVIC ACTION REPORT

## RELATIVE DESCRIPTION OF PROJECTS

The school construction is moving along rapidly. The latrine is almost completed. We distributed scrap lumber to the villagers this week.

No	DESCRIPTION	AREA/DISTRICT	UNIT(S) INVOLVED	DATE BEGUN	DATE OR % COMPL
64.	Construction Refurbishing School	Dong Hai II/Duc Tu	D/16th Armor & III ARVN Ranger Group	23 May 66	80%
65.	Health & Sanitation MEDCAP	Dong Hai II/Duc Tu	D/16th Armor	23 May 66	Continuous
66.	Community Relations Soap distribution	Dong Hai II/Duc Tu	D/16th Armor	23 May 66	Continuous
67.	Community Relations Lumber distribution	Dong Hai II/Duc Tu	D/16th Armor	23 Jun 66	Continuous
68.	Commerce & Industry Jobs for Vietnamese	Base camp/Duc Tu	D/16th Armor	1 Jan 66	Continuous

## RELATIVE DESCRIPTION OF PROJECTS

Construction of the Dong Hai II School has slowed down this week. The furniture is finished and we are planning to start classes next week. Our MEDCAP team treated 27 patients this week. D/16th Armor distributed two boxes of soap to the villagers. We hauled one truck load of lumber this week. Our unit employs six Vietnamese.

No	DESCRIPTION	AREA/DISTRICT	UNIT(S) INVOLVED	DATE BEGUN	DATE OR % COMPL
69.	Transportation Hauling sand & gravel	Tan Hiep, Khu V/Duc Tu	173d Engr Co	24 Jul 66	Continuous

# 173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE (SEP) CIVIC ACTION REPORT

No	DESCRIPTION	AREA/DISTRICT	UNIT(S) INVOLVED	DATE BEGUN	DATE OR % COMPL
70.	Construction Landscaping	Phuong Lam	173d Engr Co	24 Jul 66	26 Jul 66
71.	Construction Road repair	Da Hoa	173d Engr Co	25 Jul 66	28 Jul 66
72.	Commerce & Industry Jobs for Vietnamese	Bien Hoa/Duc Tu	173d Engr Co	1 Mar 66	Continuous

## NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF PROJECTS

The 173d Engr Co hauled sand and gravel for base material for the construction of the teachers office at the Tan Hiep School. The sand and gravel hauls for the Khu V School ended this week. In the forward area of the brigades TAOB, the 173d Engr Co cleared two areas. One was by hand for the Phuong Lam School and the other was by bucket loader for the Phuong Lam Dispensary. Hwy 20 under went road repair operations in four separate locations near the village of Da Hoa. Sand and gravel were hauled for fill material for pit holes and a platoon sized effort made the road passable at each of the four locations. We continue to employ 20 Vietnamese laborers.

No	DESCRIPTION	AREA/DISTRICT	UNIT(S) INVOLVED	DATE BEGUN	DATE OR % COMPL
73.	Education & Training English classes	Tan Mai/Duc Tu	172d MI Det	13 Nov 65	Continuous
74.	Community Relations Aid to Orphanage	Tan Mai/Duc Tu	172d MI Det	13 Nov 65	Continuous

## NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF PROJECTS

During the previous reporting period three classes were conducted at the Tan Mai Orphanage. There were approximately thirty-five students in each class. The 172d MI Det distributed one bundle of clothing, one box of soap, two boxes of dried milk, two boxes of flour, two boxes of soup base, two boxes of pork and beans, two boxes of Quaker Oats, and a large box of toys to the children at the Tan Mai Orphanage.

# 173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE (SEP) CIVIC ACTION REPORT

No	DESCRIPTION	AREA/DISTRICT	UNIT(S) INVOLVED	DATE BEGUN	DATE OR % COMPLETION
75.	Health & Sanitation MEDCAP	Bien Hoa, Tan Mai/ Duc Tu	3d MASH HHC Bde	7 Nov 65	Continuous
76.	Health & Sanitation Surgery program	Base camp/Duc Tu	3d MASH	23 May 66	Continuous
77.	Commerce & Industry Jobs for Vietnamese	Base camp/Duc Tu	3d MASH	1 Jan 66	Continuous
78.	Community Relations Food, soap, and toy distribution	Tan Mai/Duc Tu	3d MASH	27 Jul 66	Continuous

## NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF PROJECTS

9 CIDG members received emergency treatment. One Vietnamese child was seen and referred to the Bien Hoa Hospital for plastic surgery. Distribution of food, soap, dietics, and toys were given to the Tan Mai Orphanage and to the Bien Hoa Hospital. We employ 25 Vietnamese laborers.

No	DESCRIPTION	AREA/DISTRICT	UNIT(S) INVOLVED	DATE BEGUN	DATE OR % COMPLETION
79.	Construction Three classrooms	Ngu Phuc/Duc Tu	Co A, 82d Avn Bn 38th Arty Bn ARVN	1 Feb 66	95%
80.	Health & Sanitation MEDCAP	Van Coi, Hanoi/ Duc Tu	25th Med Det	1 Feb 66	Continuous
81.	Commerce & Industry Jobs for Vietnamese	Base camp/Duc Tu	Co A, 82d Avn Bn	1 Feb 66	Continuous

## NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF PROJECTS

The school at Ngu Phuc is almost completed. The MEDCAP team treated 508 persons (92 were PVE/P dependents). We continue to employ 45 Vietnamese.

# 173D AIRBORNE BRIGADE (SEP) CIVIC ACTION REPORT


NO	DESCRIPTION	AREA/DISTRICT	UNIT(S) INVOLVED	DATE BEGUN	DATE OR % COMPL
82.	Health & Sanitation MEDCAP	Phuong Lam, Trai Lam Cay, Phu Lam, Tho Lam/ Dinh Quan	S5	19 Jul 66	30 Jul 66
83.	Community Relations Food distribution	Phuong Lam, Trai Lam Cay, Phu Lam, Tho Lam/ Dinh Quan	S5	19 Jul 66	30 Jul 66
84.	Health & Sanitation Surgery program	Phuong Lam/Dinh Quan	S5	19 Jul 66	30 Jul 66

## NARRATIVE DESCRIPTION OF PROJECTS

For the period 19 Jul 66 to 30 Jul 66 the 173d Abn Bde (Sep) operated in the AURORA II TAOR. Our MEDCAP team treated 715 persons during this period. We distributed 1000 pounds of clothing, 40 cases of soup, 36 cases of cooking oil, 5100 pounds of flour, 800 pounds of paddy rice, 800 pounds of polished rice, 1010 gallons of kerosene, and CARE sewing kits. A minor surgery program was performed on a regular basis in the Phuong Lam Special Forces Dispensary.

THEME OF MESSAGE: 1st Infantry Division Power

MESSAGE ADDRESSES TO: VC Units



CÁC BẠN KHÔNG CÓ MỘT HY VONG NÀO CHIẾN THẮNG ĐƯỢC  
LỰC LƯỢNG HÙNG HẬU CỦA QUÂN LỰC VIỆT NAM CỘNG HÒA  
VÀ ĐỒNG MINH.

ENGLISH TRANSLATION

Side I: Illustration of US and GVN flag and soldier.  
(You have no hope of winning against our powerful ARVN and Allied Forces.)

Side II: Attention Viet Cong!

Powerful ARVN and Allied Forces are now operating in this area. We have brought with us combat-hardened 1st Infantry Division soldiers, artillery and air power. We have also brought with us newer and more powerful weapons against which you have no defense. We are using every means possible to aid the GVN in bringing peace and security to the people of South Vietnam. To achieve this we shall pursue you relentlessly until you and your cadre have no hiding places left. Yours is a hopeless cause. Why suffer and die needlessly? Rally now! Use the National Safe Conduct Pass before it's too late.

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THEME OF MESSAGE: Movement Instructions

MESSAGE ADDRESSED TO: People of Long An

Kể từ nay tới ngày 15.7.1966 đồng bào phải rời khỏi vùng oanh kích, vào các Ấp an ninh thuộc Quận Cần Đức và Cần Giuộc, nơi đây chính quyền sẽ tiếp đón và cung cấp đầy đủ vật chất cho đời sống đồng bào.

Sau ngày 15.7.1966 đồng bào nào không rời cư khỏi vùng oanh kích chính quyền sẽ không bảo đảm sinh mạng và tài sản của đồng bào.

CHÁNH QUYỀN TỈNH LONG AN

DIỆT TRỪ CỘNG SẢN LÃ YÊU NƯỚC 317

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ENGLISH TRANSLATION: The people of Can Duc and Can Giouc, the VC is hiding along the Nha Be river to terrorize the innocent people and destroy our economy. The authority of Long An Province decided to bomb along the Nha Be River of Can Giouc and Can Duc districts, 2000 meters from the riverside toward inland ( an area including Hiep Phuoc, Binh Khanh, Thoi Pong I Phuoc-vinh-Dong, Tan Tap and An Thoi Dong II village) "Down to the Communist Aggressors".

Side 2: From today to the 15 July 1966, you must move out of the mentioned area and settle in secured hamlets of Can Giouc districts where you will be welcomed and given necessary help.

After 15 July 1966, if you do not move out of the above area, the authorities will not be responsible for your lives and properties.

Long An Province


Kill the Communists is to love ones country.

17-2

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THEME OF MESSAGE: Jody Leaflet #1

MESSAGE ADDRESSED TO: VC & NVA Personnel



EM KHÔNG BIẾT ANH ĐANG Ở ĐÂU? HIỆN ANH ĐANG LÀM GÌ?

ENGLISH TRANSLATION: Side 1: (Silhouette of girl, sitting by an open window with a full moon outside and open doorway near the window.)

TEXT: "I do not know where he is now. What is he doing at this time?"

Side 2: (Same as front, except silhouette of man standing in doorway.)

TEXT: Return to your loved ones by rallying to the just cause.

17-3

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THEME OF MESSAGE: Power (helicopters)

MESSAGE ADDRESSED TO: VC Units




Side 2: Attention VC!

Why do you continue to struggle and fight, in hardship and misery, for an unjust cause? All your leaders give you are false promises of victory, urging you to risk your life against our awesome power. How can you possibly hope to win against our overwhelming military superiority? Not only do our soldiers have the latest in weapons and equipment, but, they have armor, artillery and planes to support them. One of the most fearsome airplanes at our disposal is the helicopter. The helicopter can search you out anywhere. It can hover over your positions and direct artillery and airstrikes on you. It can fly low and surprise you with deadly machine gun fire or rockets. It can land anywhere and bring troops right into your midst. Why continue the futile struggle against such power when the only reward you will get will be a shameful death and an unmarked grave? Don't waste your youth needlessly. Use the National Safe Conduct Pass, rally now to the just cause and build a new life in peace.

THEME OF MESSAGE: Captured Rice

MESSAGE ADDRESSED TO: VC



GAO TÍCH THU ĐƯỢC CỦA VIỆT CÔNG MÃ TRƯỚC ĐÂY VIỆT  
CÔNG ĐÃ CƯỚP CỦA ĐỒNG BÀO SẼ ĐƯỢC PHÂN PHÁT LẠI  
CHO ĐỒNG BÀO.

ENGLISH TRANSLATION: ATTENTION VIET CONG!


In support of The GVN the American Forces have recovered another rice cache which you stole from the people. This rice will be returned to its rightful owners, the people who grew it.

Viet Cong, the army you joined or were drafted into has become nothing, but a big gang of thieves, murdering and stealing from the people. Those of you who have seen enough of this senseless killing and robbing can return to the protection of the GVN, through the Chieu Hoi Program. You will be welcomed.

For those of you who continue in the ways of terrorism and thievery, we pledge your annihilation.

TEXT OF MESSAGE: Order No. 1 (Huynh Van Lai)

MESSAGE ADDRESSED TO: C-62




ENGLISH TRANSLATION: Side 1: Men of C-62!

One of your comrades, Huynh Van Lai, has seen the light. He was tired of no food; eating peanuts and not rice. He was tired of being guarded by weapons that the cadres carried to keep him from going to his loved ones. Huynh Van Lai has rallied to the GVN and Allies. Don't live on the meager diet of the VC. Don't live under the eye of those who lie to you and take away your freedom. Rally now to the GVN.

Side 2: (Picture of Starving VC) Caption: "No rice again today?"

THEME OF MESSAGE: Leaflet Round

MESSAGE ADDRESSED TO: VC



ENGLISH TRANSLATION: Illustration Caution; The next artillery shell may kill you instead of dropping this leaflet.

Side 2: VC! This leaflet was dropped from an artillery shell which exploded in the air. This artillery shell could easily have contained explosives which would have killed you. The GVN does not want to destroy you. You must leave the Communist murderers and rally to the side of peace and freedom. Use this leaflet as a warning, and rally to the Government at the first opportunity. Do not wait until an explosive shell kills you.

MESSAGE THEME: Futility and Destruction

MESSAGE ADDRESSED TO: VC Guerillas



ENGLISH TRANSLATION: Side 1: (Illustration of 2 VC walking thru a destroyed village)

Panel 1; "Look at the harm we bring to our own people. Can this be right?"

Panel 2; "We have been duped by the Communists. Let's rally to the Just Cause."

Side 2: Attention Viet Cong Guerillas!

Every village you enter becomes a target for the GVN and Allied Forces. The people fear your presence, yet you claim to be their liberators. The innocent suffer because of you. Your aims are futile because you are on the wrong side. The enemy in the war is not the GVN, not the Americans, not the Koreans, not the Australians, not the New Zealanders, You, Viet Cong, are the aggressor. You Viet Cong, are being used by the communists as part of their plan to conquer all the free peoples of Southeast Asia. You, Viet Cong, are the real enemy.

THEME OF MESSAGE: Post Operative

MESSAGE ADDRESSED TO: Civilians in Operational Area



BÌNH SĨ HOA-KỲ THUỘC SƯ  
ĐOÀN 25 BỘ-BÌNH HIỆN ĐANG Ở  
TẠI ĐÂY ĐỂ GIÚP ĐỠ ĐỒNG-BÀO.  
CHÚNG TÔI RẤT VUI-SỐNG  
ĐƯỢC CẤP PHÁT THUỐC MEN  
CHO ĐỒNG-BÀO KHI ĐỒNG-BÀO  
CẦN ĐẾN. CHÚNG TÔI CÓ THỂ  
XÂY-CÁI TRƯỜNG HỌC, CẦU  
CỔNG, ĐƯỜNG XÁ, VÀ GIÚP  
ĐỒNG-BÀO TẠO LẬP MỘT ĐỜI  
SỐNG Tươi ĐẸP HƠN.

XIN ĐỒNG BÀO HÃY HỢP  
LỰC VỚI CHÚNG TÔI ĐỂ TIÊU  
DIỆT BỌN VIỆT CỘNG.

ENGLISH TRANSLATION: Side 1: The US soldiers of the 25th Infantry Division have been in your area making it safe by clearing the area of the VC. You have only seen a small part of our massive strength. This mighty force, known the world over, stands ready to make your life safe. Side 2: Your friends, the US soldiers of the 25th Infantry Division, are here to help you. We will give you medical assistance when you need it. We can build schools, bridges and roads to make life easier for you. Help us together to defeat the VC forever.





DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
Headquarters, II Field Force Vietnam  
APO San Francisco 96266

AVXD

4 July 1966

SUBJECT: Air Force Airlift Capability

TO: Commander  
United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam  
APO 96243

1. Recent experience in Operations Birmingham and El Paso has pointed up a serious need to improve the responsiveness and flexibility of Air Force airlift capability to meet changing requirements of the tactical situation.

2. The airlift support currently provided by Air Force aircraft (C-123's and C-130's) is programmed by the Airlift Control Center (ALCC) of the 315th ACW, based on requests channeled through MACV-IMA. MACV Directive 55-4, 11 June 1966, is the basis for this request system. There are no provisions in this directive which permit the diversion of Air Force aircraft already allocated to missions or destinations of a greater and more immediate tactical importance, without going through channels to MACV-COC. For example, assume an airlift has been requested and allocated to move a battalion from Lai Khe to Minh Than to support a planned operation. During the initial stages of this move, a tactical situation develops at Hon Quan which requires the battalion to be deployed there instead of Minh Than. Under the present system the responsible commander must request the diversion by submitting a new request through routine channels, a time consuming process at best. Similar situations occur in resupply airlifts, such as requesting interchange of commodities.

3. Recognizing that ultimate control of Air Force aircraft must remain in Air Force channels, a recommended solution is the establishment of airlift Movement Control Teams (MCT). MCT would consist of a Mission Commander, located at the major focal point of the operation, and an airlift coordinator at each on-load and off-load airfield. It is essential that these teams be furnished adequate radio communication between the mission commander and (a) ALCC and (b) Airlift Coordinators. They would have the authority to divert, through the Mission Commander, currently allocated aircraft as necessary to respond to the tactical requirement.

4. In essence, elements of this organization already exist. Normally, each operation has a Mission Commander and in some cases representation at the major on-load and off-load airfields. What is required is the authorization to establish procedures and obtain the necessary coordination.

AVXD

4 July 1966

SUBJECT: Air Force Airlift Capability

equipment and qualified personnel to implement the MCT concept.

5. It is requested that this proposal be implemented during a future selected tactical operation. This headquarters will make personnel available, as desired, to assist in formulating plans and procedures.

/s/ Richard T Knowles  
/t/ RICHARD T. KNOWLES  
Brigadier General, USA  
Chief of Staff

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## I STATISTICAL SUMMARY TACTICAL AIR SUPPORT 1 May - 31 July 1966

	SUB <u>TOTAL</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
1. Total air sorties during period:	USAF 6,389 USN 4,391 VNAF 3,741	
		<u>14,521</u>
2. Number of sorties flown by US aircraft in support of ARVN:	6,134	
3. Number sorties flown by VNAF in support of ARVN:	2,771	
4. Total number sorties flown in support of ARVN:		<u>8,905</u>
5. Number sorties flown by US aircraft in support of US Forces:	4,646	
6. Number sorties flown by VNAF aircraft in support of US Forces:	970	
7. Total number sorties flown in support of US Forces:		<u>5,616</u>
8. Number SKY SPOT missions flown in support of ARVN:		<u>284</u>
9. Number SKY SPOT missions flown in support of US:	1st Inf Div 165 25th Inf Div 12 173d Abn Bde 7 1st ATF 4	<u>188</u>
10. Results of air strikes:		
KIA (BO) 411		
KIA (EST) <u>1,584</u>		
Structures destroyed <u>4,520</u>		
Structures damaged <u>3,343</u>		
Secondary explosions <u>156</u>		
11. Ordnance expended:		
Bombs <u>8,880</u>		
Rockets <u>10,454</u>		
CBU <u>774,800</u>		
NAPALM <u>5,262</u>		
20 mm <u>1,590,400</u>		

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## II LIMITING FACTORS

1. Shortage of air munitions, particularly CBU, MK-24 Flares, heavy bombs, long delay fuzes and Daisy Outter Fuze Extensions, was a matter of concern throughout the period.
2. Fill of requested preplanned missions was less than during the previous reporting period. TASE occasionally would not accept all preplanned requests on the basis that TACC could not allocate sufficient aircraft.
3. Navy flights frequently showed up early for scheduled TOT's.
4. A few aircraft, particularly Navy flights, showed up at the target having ordnance at variance with the TACC Frag Order resulting in reduced effectiveness of the strike.
5. Weather throughout the period was generally favorable to air operations with the exception of July when early morning ground fog and rain were recurring problems.

## III ARC LIGHT MISSIONS

A total of 34 Arc Light Missions were flown within III CTZ during the reporting period utilizing a total of 300 B-52 aircraft.

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